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ARGUMENT 
I. Reott Is Not Foreclosed From Contesting Equitable Title, 
At trial, Reott, without complaint or objection from Wasatch,1 contested Wasatch's 
claims to legal and equitable title under all theories Reott had pleaded. These theories 
included, inter alia, constructive fraud under LLC.A. § 25-6-6 (1989) and Sutton's lack of 
authority to execute the June Letter Agreement and Mineral Lease Assignments (MLAs). 
Now, for the very first time, Wasatch contends that these theories extensively contested 
at trial are somehow foreclosed due to this Court's reversal of summary judgment for 
Reott in Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C v. Reott, 2007 UT App. 223, 163 P.3d 713 ("Wasatch 
r \ (See Appellees Br., at 28, 32.) 
Wasatch's arguments, when reviewed in the procedural context of the case, evidence 
a fundamental misunderstanding of summary judgment and remand after summary 
judgment has been reversed. While "[t]he moving party determines the scope of a 
motion for summary judgment," see Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d, 1178, (Utah 1993), 
neither the chosen scope of a motion for summary judgment nor the chosen scope of an 
appeal therefrom circumscribes the merits of the case or issues that may be raised upon 
denial of summary judgment or on remand after reversal of the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment. "The denial of a motion for summary judgment on an issue is not a 
final decision on the merits of that issue." LeVanger v. Highland Estates, 2003 UT App. 
377, f^ 13, 80 P.3d 569. Rather, "[t]he denial of a motion for a summary judgment. . . is 
strictly a pretrial order that decides only one thing—that the case should go to trial." Id. 
1
 For ease of reference, Wasatch and BBC are jointly referred to herein as "Wasatch." 
1 
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(quoting Switzerland Cheese Ass 'n v. E. Home's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966)). 
Arguments not raised in a motion for summary judgment are not waived or foreclosed 
should summary judgment be denied or reversed on appeal. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2005 UT App. 279, \ 8, 119 P.3d 302 (on remand after 
reversal of summary judgment, plaintiffs were not foreclosed from raising other available 
arguments (adverse possession or lack of good faith purchaser) to defeat defendants' 
superior title, even if the arguments were not raised on appeal or on summary judgment)); 
Levanger, 2003 UT App. 377, f^ 15 (holding that defendants never waived the issue of 
standing although standing was not addressed on appeal). Accord Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 
P.2d 1178,1182 (Utah 1993); Lane v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Utah 1984). 
Wasatch I, which reviewed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to 
Reott, determined that Sutton's authority under the statute of frauds and Mission's actual 
intent to defraud should be remanded for trial because there were material issues of fact. 
2007 UT App. 223, ffl| 30, 36. As to authority, this Court held that "Sutton, acting alone, 
did not have the requisite written authority to assign the. Section 32 [Leases]" and that 
Sutton therefore did not satisfy the statute of frauds' written authorization requirement 
absent a legally effective oral authorization or ratification, which would have to be 
proved at trial. See id. ff 29-30. Except as to this single issue, neither the scope of 
summary judgment nor this Court's prior opinion "circumscribe[d] the scope of the 
court's inquiry into the merits of the case" or permanently fixed the "ledger" of 
arguments that Reott could raise on remand. {See Appellees Br., at 32,41.) 
4815-7101-0438/RE009-002 
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II. The Trial Court Exceeded The Scope Of This Court's Mandate. 
Even more, Wasatch underestimates the force of this Court's mandate on remand. 
Explicit in this Court's remand is that Sutton did not have actual authority, acting alone, 
to transfer Mission's Section 32 Leases to Wasatch, and that there were only two other 
avenues by which Sutton's actions could be made effective. See Wasatch /, 2007 UT 
App. 223, ^  29, 30. This Court's mandate was clear and precise: 
We therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to the issue of 
legal title and remand to the trial court to determine whether Mission gave Sutton 
oral authorization to execute the Assignments or whether Mission subsequently 
ratified the Assignments; and, if so, the effect thereof. 
Id. % 30 (emphasis added). The trial court, however, exceeded this Court's mandate by 
concluding that "[i]f Sutton had actual authority to execute the lease assignment 
documents, Wasatch held legal title and was a successor in interest." (See CR 4 (R. 8118, 
%4) (emphasis added).)2 Even more, this Court already held that Sutton did not have 
"actual authority" (what this Court called "general power") to alone convey Mission's 
interests in the Section 32 Leases: 
Thus, although the MOA gives Sutton the general power to act on behalf of and 
under the authorization of Mission in the assignment of its property, the MOA 
limits this power in that it explicitly requires two Mission managers to execute 
instruments conveying Mission's title to real property, such as the Assignments. 
Wasatch /, 2007 UT App. 223, % 29. 
Recognizing the difficulty in proving oral authorization or ratification, (see Appeal 
Br., at 14-15), Wasatch successfully urged the trial court to expand and refirame the issue 
2
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on redemption and quiet title are denoted 
"FR" and "CR," respectively, and on damages are denoted "FD" and "CD," respectively. 
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despite this Court's mandate. (See Appellees Br., at 34, 41-43.) Rather than prove oral 
authorization or ratification, Wasatch resorted to the decided and foreclosed concept of 
general power, relabeling it as "actual authority." Wasatch argues that "any form of 
authorization that complies with, or is excepted from, the statute of frauds is sufficient to 
quiet title in favor of Wasatch." (Id. at 43.) Despite this Court's clear mandate, Wasatch 
also contends that the issue remanded to the trial court for consideration was not oral 
authorization or ratification, but rather the general "underlying concepts of governance 
and control." (Id.) Wasatch further attempts to circumvent the mandate rule by arguing 
that this Court's mandate offered only "words of prediction, not direction." (Id. at 42.) 
Despite Wasatch's efforts to reframe the issue, this Court's mandate arose not out of a 
discussion of Sutton's authority generally, but whether the act of Sutton disposing of 
Mission's assets satisfied the statute of frauds' written authorization requirement. See 
Wasatch /, 2007 UT App. 223, ffl 28-30. Holding that "Sutton, acting alone, did not 
have the requisite written authority to assign the Section 32 [Leases]," this Court then 
explained that there were two possible exceptions to the statute of frauds' written 
authorization requirement: oral authorization and ratification. See id. f 30. This Court's 
remand could not have been clearer or more specific. The trial court violated this Court's 
mandate by instead resorting to the foreclosed concept of general power relabeled as 
"actual authority." 
Utah courts have "consistently refused to uphold the power of a corporate president to 
act in behalf of his corporation without authorization from its board of directors." 
Lloydona Peters Enters., Inc. v. Dorius, 658 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 1983). "Individual 
directors, or any number of them less than a quorum, have no authority as directors to 
4825-7301-0438/RE009-002 
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III. Sutton's Lack Of Authority To Assign The Section 32 Leases Also Defeats 
Wasatch's Equitable Interest In The Leases. 
Not surprisingly, in light of its tenuous claim to legal title, Wasatch devotes much of 
its brief to arguing equitable title. The trial court's conclusion that Wasatch obtained 
equitable title to the Section 32 Leases by the June Letter Agreement (see CR 9 (R. 
8119)) is error because Sutton lacked authority to execute the June Letter Agreement. 
The Utah statute of frauds provides that "[e]very contract . . . for the sale[] of. . . any 
interest in lands[] shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the . . . sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing" U.C.A. § 25-5-3 (1953) (emphasis added).4 
This Court already held that the MO A gives written authority to Mission's managers, 
but 4Cthe MOA limits this power in that it explicitly requires two Mission managers to 
execute instruments conveying Mission's title to real property, such as the Assignments." 
Wasatch I, 2007 UT App. 223, % 29. This holding is equally binding where the 
instrument—the June Letter Agreement—conveys Mission's equitable title to real 
property. 
Again circumscribing Reott's arguments on appeal, Wasatch mistakenly argues that 
the issue of Sutton's "[a]uthority to execute the [June] Letter Agreement is an issue long 
bind the corporation." Id. (citation omitted). 6€No officer or agent of a corporation has 
any authority to make a contract to sell its real estate without. . . action [by the Board of 
Directors]." Foster v. Blake Heights Corp,, 530 P.2d 815, 818 (Utah 1974). 
4
 See also Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Utah 1986); Cutwright v. 
Union Savings & Inv. Co,, 94 P. 984, 985 (Utah 1908) ("No doubt the transfer of any 
interest in real property, whether equitable or legal, is within the statue of frauds."). 
Accord Coulter & Smith, Ltd, v. Russell, 1999 UT App. 55, % 12, 976 P.2d 1218 ("[A]n 
option to purchase real estate is an interest in land within the statute of frauds."). 
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resolved in this litigation" and therefore "is no longer available to Reott." (See Appellees 
Br., at 32-33.) Wasatch relies on the trial court's prior ruling on summary judgment and 
this Court's opinion in Wasatch /, arguing that both held that 'the [June] Letter 
Agreement conveyed equitable title but for the alleged fraud." (Id. at 32.) This is simply 
not true. Wasatch does not and cannot cite any language in either opinion. Instead, 
Wasatch apparently divines some implicit emanations from the orders to make this claim, 
but in doing so it misconstrues the trial court's and this Court's prior holdings. 
Reott advanced two grounds for summary judgment: (1) the MLAs conveyed no legal 
title because they failed to disclose Sutton's representative capacity as agent for Mission, 
and (2) Mission's actual intent to defraud its creditors defeated any equitable interest 
claimed by Wasatch by virtue of the June Letter Agreement. (R. 4812-4815.) 
In granting summary judgment, the trial court held that Sutton's failure to disclose his 
representative capacity was fatal to the conveyance of legal title, (R. 4813-4814), but this 
Court reversed and held that failure to disclose the agent's capacity did not defeat legal 
title. See Wasatch /, 2007 UT App. 223, \ 27. Neither court held that Sutton had the 
requisite authority from Mission to comply with the statute of frauds and the MO A.5 
The trial court also ruled on summary judgment that, although Wasatch "claim[ed]" 
an equitable interest in the Section 32 Leases by virtue of the June Letter Agreement, the 
5
 Whether a technical defect in an instrument itself defeats a conveyance is a far 
different issue from whether an unauthorized agent can bind his principal by the 
instrument, defect or not. Wasatch misses this distinction, arguing that "[tjhere was no 
defect in Sutton's execution of the [June] Letter Agreement" because it "identified 
Mission as the party obligating itself to transfer title to the leases, with Sutton signing in a 
representative capacity as 'Manager.'" (See Appellees Br., at 33.) 
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fraudulent transfer under section 25-6-5 (1988) defeated any such claim to an equitable 
interest. (R. 4815.) This Court reversed, holding that whether the transfer was fraudulent 
could only be determined by trial. See Wasatch I, 2007 UT App. 223, f 31. Again, 
neither court held that the "[June] Letter Agreement conveyed equitable title but for the 
alleged fraud," as Wasatch contends. (See Appellees Br., at 32.) In fact, the trial court 
expressly concluded in its memorandum decision that the June Letter Agreement 
conveyed no equitable title not only because of the fraudulent transfer, but also because 
the transfer was void for lack of consideration. (R. 4815.) The trial court never held that 
the June Letter Agreement conveyed equitable title, and neither has this Court. 
Indeed, it is incongruous to suggest, as Wasatch does (see Appellees Br., at 33), that 
Sutton had no authority to convey legal title yet had authority to convey equitable title 
when neither the statute of frauds nor the MOA make any distinction between legal title 
and equitable title. Because Mission did not orally authorize or subsequently ratify 
Sutton's execution of the June Letter Agreement, as explained below, Wasatch did not 
obtain equitable title to the Section 32 Leases. Nothing in the remand order foreclosed 
Reott from making that argument at trial or her on appeal. 
IV. Jager Did Not Orally Authorize Or Ratify the June Transfer. 
The trial court erroneously concluded that the Jager Letter dated January 17, 2001, 
established that "Jager either gave oral authorization to Sutton of the . . . June 21, 2000 
transaction!] at the time [it] took place or, after receiving full knowledge of the 
transaction!], ratified [it] at a later date[.]" (FR 141 (R. 8116); CR 7 (R. 8118).) Sutton's 
execution of the June Letter Agreement and MLAs was not orally authorized or ratified 
7 
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by Mission, and thus Wasatch did not receive equitable or legal title to the Section 32 
Leases sufficient for redemption. 
A. Jager did not have authority to orally authorize the June transaction. 
Any oral authorization by Jager at the time of the June 2000 transfer was ineffective 
as a matter of law because the trial court found that Jager was not a manager at that time 
and thus had no authority to act for or bind Mission. The trial court expressly found that 
"at the time of . . . the June 2000 transaction!] , Sutton was the sole manager of Mission." 
(See FR 107.) Accordingly, the trial court erroneously concluded that Jager "gave oral 
authorization to Sutton of the . . . June 21, 2000 transaction^ at the time [it] took 
place[.]" (See FR 141 (R. 8116).) Wasatch's recitation of facts allegedly evidencing 
Jager's oral authorization is therefore irrelevant 
Additionally, under Colorado law an oral authorization is ineffective as a matter of 
law. See, e.g., Simpson v. Nelson, 208 P. 455, 456 (Colo. 1922).6 Again revealing 
Wasatch's misunderstanding of summary judgment, Wasatch argues that the law of the 
case doctrine requires that Utah law, not Colorado law, govern the question of Sutton's 
authority from Mission because the choice-of-law question regarding authority was 
allegedly decided implicitly in the first appeal. (See Appellees Br., at 35-36.) While this 
6
 Wasatch's citation to Brammer v. Ellison, 257 P.2d 430 (Colo. 1953) for the 
proposition that Colorado recognizes oral authorization is not helpful because the opinion 
does not disclose the basis for the husband's authorization, i.e. whether it was written or 
oral. Subsequent cases have reinforced the principle that Colorado law gives no legal 
effect to oral authorization. See, e.g., Nunnally v. Hilderman, 373 P.2d 940, 941 (Colo. 
1962) (holding that the parol evidence "as a matter of law do[es] not constitute specific 
authorization in writing empowering the Bank to enter into a contract with [purchaser] 
which would be binding on [sellers]"). 
8 
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Court relied on Utah law regarding the statute of frauds in Wasatch I, it did not decide, 
expressly or implicitly, the choice-of-law issue regarding authority, which this Court 
recognized when it directed the trial court 4Cto determine whether Mission gave Sutton 
oral authorization . . . or whether Mission subsequently ratified the Assignment, and, if 
so, the effect thereof" 2007 UT App. 223, % 30 (emphasis added). The legal effect 
thereof is determined according to Colorado law, the state of Mission's incorporation.7 
Wasatch also incorrectly argues that Reott failed to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's factual findings on oral authorization and ratification and instead simply 
"reargue[d] the facts." {See Appellees Br., at 37.) Contrary to Wasatch's assertions, 
Reott does not challenge any of the trial court's factual findings with respect to oral 
authorization, but rather accepts the trial court's factual findings and argues that the trial 
court's legal conclusions drawn from these facts are erroneous. "[I]n cases where a party 
raises a legal issue—not dependent on factual findings but instead challenging whether 
the trial court properly applied the law to the facts as found below—there is no need to 
marshal." Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App. 249, \ 2, n. 1, affd in part and rev 'd 
in part on other grounds, 2010 UT 43. Furthermore, the trial court's conclusions on both 
oral authorization and ratification were based solely on the January 17, 2001 Jager letter, 
from which this Court may draw its own independent conclusions. See Harris v. IES 
Assocs., Inc., 2003 UT App. 112, f 27, 69 P.3d 297 ("[T]he trial court's interpretation of 
written documents . . . presents a question of law[.]"). Nothing in the Jager Letter even 
7
 Even under Utah law, oral authorization has no legal effect because Utah no longer 
recognizes an oral authorization exception. (See Appeal Br. at 23 and cases cited therein.) 
9 
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faintly supports a finding of a grant of oral authority by Jager. (See Appeal Br., Add. H.) 
B. Jager could not ratify the June transaction on behalf of Mission. 
The trial court also erroneously concluded that Jager ratified the June transaction 
"based on the contents of Jager's letter dated January 17, 2001." (See CLR 7 (R. 8118, f 
7)). Wasatch stretches this conclusion, arguing that not only did Jager expressly ratify 
the June transaction by the Jager Letter, but also ratified the June transaction "impliedly 
through knowing acquiescence," i.e. by Mission's failure to timely repudiate or disaffirm 
the June transaction. (See Appellees Br., at 38-40.)8 
As with oral authority, the trial court's findings establish that any ratification by Jager 
of the June transaction would be ineffective as a matter of law because Jager was not a 
manager and had no authority to ratify, expressly or impliedly, the June transaction.9 
Wasatch also erroneously contends that implied ratification dispenses with the need to 
comply with corporate formalities in the ratification. (See Appellees Br., at 39, 40.) 
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982) is dispositive on this point. In 
Bradshaw, one of eight tenants in common entered into an oral agreement with certain 
buyers to purchase the tenants' property. When two of the tenants refused to execute the 
deeds, the buyers brought suit for specific performance of the oral agreement, arguing 
that the tenants impliedly ratified the agreement by their failure to repudiate or disaffirm 
8
 The trial court's conclusion that Mission ratified the June transaction was not based 
on "implied ratification," but rather was solely "based on the contents of Jager's letter 
dated January 17,2001." (&>eCLR7(R. 8118, f 7).) 
9
 Even if Jager was a manager, there was no express ratification based on the Jager 
Letter. As detailed in Reott's opening brief, the contents of the Jager Letter establish that 
Jager did not have full knowledge of all terms of the June Letter Agreement or the full 
details of the June transfer. (See June Letter Agreement (Appeal Br., Addendum C).) 
10 
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the oral agreement. Id. at 78. The Utah Supreme Court rejected that argument: 
[TJhere was no ratification as a matter of law because the Utah statute of frauds 
requires that any agent executing an agreement conveying an interest in land on 
behalf of his principal must be authorized in writing. . . . In order to enforce an 
oral agreement, the same kind of authorization that is required to clothe an agent 
initially with authority to contract must be given by the principal to constitute a 
ratification of an unauthorized act. Where the law requires the authority to be 
given in writing, the ratification must also generally be in writing. . . . There was, 
therefore, no ratification in this case. 
649 P.2d at 78-79 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, because the statute of frauds required Sutton's authority to be in 
writing, see Wasatch I, 2007 UT App. 223, \ 28, Mission's ratification must also be in 
writing, see Bradshaw, 649 P.2d at 79. As a matter of law, there can therefore be no 
implied ratification by Mission of Sutton's unauthorized execution of the June Letter 
Agreement or MLAs. Furthermore, because "the same kind of authorization that is 
required to clothe an agent initially with authority to contract must be given by the 
principal to constitute a ratification," see id., there can be no express ratification by the 
Jager Letter because it was not signed by two Mission managers. 
Wasatch did not obtain equitable or legal title to the Section 32 Leases and had no 
right to redeem the Section 32 Leases because the trial court's factual findings simply do 
not support its conclusion that Mission orally authorized or ratified Sutton's execution of 
the June Letter Agreement or the MLAs. 
V. Fraudulent Transfer Under U.CA. § 25-6-6 Defeats Wasatch's Equitable 
Interest In The June Leases. 
Even more, a fraudulent transfer under section 25-6-6 defeats both the transfer of 
legal title as well as the transfer of equitable title. UFTA specifically defines "transfer" 
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as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of 
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, . . . ." U.C.A. § 25-6-
2(12) (1992) (emphasis added). In fact, by defining when "[a] transfer is made . . . with 
respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a 
seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset" see U.C.A. § 25-6-7(l)(a) 
(1988) (emphasis added), UFTA establishes that "an interest in an asset" includes an 
equitable interest under a purchase contract. Therefore, any transfer of Mission's 
equitable interest in the June Leases to Wasatch is governed by and can be set aside by 
UFTA.10 
In spite of the plain language of UFTA, Wasatch argues that constructive fraud cannot 
defeat equitable title because constructive fraud "involves no dishonesty." (Appellees 
Br., at 29.) Wasatch argues that only inequitable conduct can defeat rights arising from 
equity—i.e. equitable title—and therefore only an actual intent to defraud can defeat 
equitable title. (Id. at 28-29.) But as Reott has explained throughout this action, it is not 
Wasatch that must be found to have acted with fraud (whether actual or constructive), but 
rather Mission. Fraud under UFTA is determined not by the actions of the transferee 
(Wasatch), but rather by the actions of the debtor (Mission). See U.C.A. § 25-6-6(1). 
Under the identical Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provision, "[t]he 
definition of the term 'transfer' as used in this Statute . . . is intended to cover any 
transaction whereby a transferor divested himself or herself, directly or indirectly, of any 
cognizable interest, legal or equitable, in the property of the transferor." Crawford v. 
Crawford, 172 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr. Fl. 1994) (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 726.102(12) 
(1987)). 
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But under Wasatch's new argument, even an actual intent to defraud on the part of 
Mission (the debtor) could not defeat Wasatch's equitable title absent a showing of 
"dishonesty" on the part of Wasatch. Such is not the law or the effect of UFTA. The 
plain language of UFTA clearly provides that fraud on the part of Mission, whether 
actual or constructive, defeats Wasatch's legal and equitable interests in the June Leases. 
VI. Reott Properly Challenged All Legal Conclusions And Factual Findings 
Regarding Fraudulent Transfer. 
Wasatch spends much of its brief arguing that Reott has failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's factual findings with respect to reasonably 
equivalent value and insolvency. Wasatch misapplies the marshaling requirement 
"[T]he marshaling requirement applies only to challenges of factual findings, not to 
conclusions of law/5 See Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, f 17, 994 P.2d 193 (Utah 2000) 
(citations omitted). "[W]here [Reott] raises a legal issue—not dependent on factual 
findings but instead challenging whether the trial court properly applied the law to the 
facts as found below—there is no need to marshal." Ostermiller, 2008 UT App. 249, f 2, 
n.l. Accord Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App. 1,203 P.3d 1020; Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 
UT App. 209,114,47 P.3d 76. 
In determining whether an issue challenged is a legal conclusion or factual issue 
subject to the marshaling requirement, Utah's appellate courts "disregard the labels 
attached to findings and conclusions and look to the substance." Gillmor v. Wright, 850 
P.2d 431, (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). "Therefore, that which a trial court labels a 
'finding of fact' may be in actuality a conclusion of law, which we review for 
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correctness." Id. (citation omitted). As in the instant case, conclusions of law are often 
implicit or inherent in the factual findings, and vice versa. See, e.g., In re Sam Oil, 817 
P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1991) (finding of fact was implicit in trial court's conclusion of law). 
Where Reott does have a duty to marshal, "only the supportive evidence is legally 
relevant and is all that counsel should call [the appellate court's] attention to.5' Kimball v. 
Kimball, 2009 UT App. 233, % 20, n.5, 217 P.3d 733 (emphasis in original). This Court 
has stated that it "do[es] not want an exhaustive review of all of the evidence presented at 
trial," but only "a precisely focused summary of all the evidence that supports any finding 
that is challenged on the ground that it is clearly erroneous." Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT 
App. 189, % 12, n.l, 51 P.3d 724 (emphasis added). "If there simply is no supportive 
evidence, counsel need only say so and the challenge will be well-taken—counsel is not 
expected to marshal the nonexistent." Kimball, 2009 UT App. 233, f 20. 
Wasatch complains that Reott's marshaling is inadequate because "Reott devotes 
nearly his entire discussion of the value issue arguing against the district court's finding 
on fraudulent transfer and constructive fraud rather than in support of them." (Appellees 
Br., at 24.) Yet Wasatch fails to cite any authority for the proposition that proper 
marshaling requires "arguing . . . in support" of the trial court's factual findings. 
Although the marshaling requirement requires that the appellant "play the 'devil's 
advocate,'" see Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 78, 100 P.3d 1177 (citation omitted), 
doing so only requires that appellant "present," not argue or explain, all facts supporting 
the trial court's finding, see id. ^ 77. In other words, marshaling "requires 'a precisely 
focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings,' correlated to the location 
14 
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of that evidence in the record." Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. v. Mapleton City, 2010 
UT 11, f 10, —P.3d— (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Once that is done, it is not 
inappropriate, as Wasatch suggests it is, to "argu[e] against the district court's findings on 
fraudulent transfer and constructive fraud rather than in support of them." (See Appellees 
Br., at 24.) Indeed, once the focused summary has been presented as required, "[t]hen, 
appellants must 'explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence.'" 
Id. f 12. And that is all that appellants must "explain." See Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 78. 
As Reott has explained, Mission's transfer of legal and equitable title in the June 
Leases to Wasatch was fraudulent under UFTA because Mission was insolvent when it 
transferred the June Leases to Wasatch and did not receive a reasonably equivalent value 
in exchange for the June Leases. See U.C.A. § 25-6-6(1). Reott has adequately 
marshaled with respect to insolvency, but Reott has no duty to marshal with respect to 
reasonably equivalent value because Reott only challenges the trial court's implicit legal 
conclusions and application of UFTA to the facts as found by the trial court. 
A. Mission was insolvent when it transferred the June Leases to Wasatch. 
As concluded by the trial court, (see CR 13.a. (R. 8121)), Mission's inability to pay 
its debts as they came due established the presumption that Mission was insolvent. See 
U.C.A. § 25-6-3(2) (1988). Thus, the burden shifted to Wasatch to prove that Mission 
was solvent, i.e. the sum of Mission's assets exceeded the sum of its debts. But the trial 
court and Wasatch ignored this shift in the burden, and Wasatch continues to argue that 
"Reott was unable to offer evidence sufficient to persuade the district court of this 
essential element of a constructive fraud claim [i.e. insolvency]." (Appellees Br., at 27.) 
15 
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Wasatch, not Reott, had this burden, but failed to meet it and prove Mission's 
solvency. Reott has thus challenged FR 121 that "[t]he sole evidence before the Court 
was that the fair value of Mission's assets as of June 21, 2000, exceeded its debts, 
notwithstanding Mission's inability as a start-up company to pay its debts as they became 
due." {See Appeal Br., at 38-39 (citing R. 8113).) FR 121 was based on FR 119 that: 
(MJission retained the following assets: 
a. The Lavinia 1-32 well (valued by Reott and Sutton at an amount in 
excess of the total of all outstanding Mission liabilities). 
b. Cash in the bank of at least $27, 236.27. 
c. Amounts held by the State of Utah as a bond of $19,943.15. 
d. The Gusher leases (the precise value of which was not addressed at 
trial but which Sutton testified had value and the Lease Acquisition 
Memorandum identified as having value). 
Taking as correct FR 119(b) and (c), Reott has properly challenged FR 119(a) and (d) 
regarding the value of the Gusher Leases and the Lavinia Well. First, the trial court and 
Wasatch conceded that Wasatch did not present any evidence of the value of the Gusher 
leases. {See FR 119 (R. 8113); (R. 827:8-9)). "If there simply is no supportive evidence, 
counsel need only say so and the challenge will be well-taken—counsel is not expected to 
marshal the nonexistent." Kimball, 2009 UT App. 233, f^ 20. Second, Reott presented a 
"precisely focused summary" of all evidence that could support the trial court's finding 
with respect to the value of the Lavinia Well, comprising testimony by BBC's witness 
Heggie Wilson, Sutton, and Reott. {See Appeal Br., at 40.) That the summary comprises 
only one page is not a failure to marshal, as Wasatch argues {see Appellees Br., at 24-
25), but rather highlights the paucity of evidence supporting FR 119(a). Indeed, Wasatch 
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did not present or cite to any other evidence in the record beyond what Reott presented 
and cited regarding the value of the Lavinia Well. {See Appellees Br., at 27-28.) 
Having presented a "precisely focused summary" of all the evidence supporting FR 
119(a), Reott has "ferreted out" "fatal flaws" in the evidence, see Utah County v. Butler', 
2008 UT 12, \ 11, 179 P.3d 775, and "explained] why [FR 119(a)] contradictfs] the clear 
weight of the evidence," see Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 78. {See Appeal Br., at 40-43.) In 
light of these fatal flaws, the evidence regarding the value of the Lavinia Well and the 
Gusher Leases11 cannot support the trial court's factual finding that "[t]he sole evidence 
before the Court was that the fair value of Mission's assets as of June 21, 2000, exceeded 
its debts, notwithstanding Mission's inability as a start-up company to pay its debts as 
they became due." {See FR 121 (R. 8113)). This Court should therefore hold that 
Wasatch failed to rebut the presumption that Mission was insolvent for failing to pay its 
debts as they came due. 
B. Mission did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the June Leases. 
With regard to reasonably equivalent value, Reott accepts the trial court's factual 
findings and only challenges the implicit legal conclusions in FR 88, which states that 
"the consideration set forth in the June 2000 Letter Agreement and the amounts 
subsequently paid by Wasatch to preserve the leases and the Jack Canyon Unit 
constituted reasonably equivalent value for the sale of the leases." {See Appeal Br., at 36 
(citing R. 8109).) Implicit in FR 88 is the legal conclusion that "the consideration set 
11
 The cash on hand and bond, as the trial court found them, totaled $47,179.42; the 
value of the Gusher leases was never established; and the value of the Lavinia Well was, 
at most, $20,000. These amounts total far less than Mission's over $1 million of debt. 
17 
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forth in the June 2000 Letter Agreement" constituted 'Value" as a matter of law within 
the meaning of UFTA. See U.C.A. § 25-6-4(1) (1988) (defining "value").12 Reott does 
not challenge the trial court's findings regarding the consideration in the June Letter 
Agreement or given by Wasatch, but only challenges the implicit legal conclusion that 
such consideration for the June transfer constituted 4Cvalue" within the meaning of UFTA. 
Examining FR 88, it is clear that the trial court implicitly determined that the 
following cash and non-cash consideration, taken together, constituted "reasonably 
equivalent value" for the June Leases: (1) "Wasatch reimbursed Mission $3,629.40 for 
rentals paid by Mission on leases purchased by Wasatch"; (2) Wasatch promised to "give 
Mission a specified percentage of any drilling deal Wasatch or Mission might negotiate 
in the future with respect to the leases purchased"; (3) Wasatch reinstated expired leases; 
(4) Wasatch assumed responsibility to "maintain the leases as lessee and unit operator"; 
and (5) "Wasatch paid to SITLA over $4,000 for assignment of the leases and for rentals 
between June 21, 2000 and August 9, 2001." (FR 82, 115-118 (R. 8108, 8112-8113)). 
Reott does not challenge these factual findings, and therefore has no duty to marshal the 
evidence to challenge the implicit conclusions of law underlying FR 88. 
As Reott has explained, as a matter of law, the June Letter Agreement's non-cash 
consideration (items (2)-(5) above) was not "value" within the definition of the UFTA. 
(See Appeal Br., at 34-36.) Taking the trial court's facts regarding the consideration 
12
 Additionally, "comment 2 to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act states that value is 
to be determined in light of the act's purpose, in order to protect the creditors. Any 
consideration not involving utility for the creditors does not comport with the statutory 
definition." In re Agricultural Research & Tech. Group, Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 540 (9th Cir. 
1990) (citation omitted). 
18 
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under the June Letter Agreement, the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding, 
although implicitly, that the non-cash consideration constituted "value." Because Reott 
has "challenged] whether the trial court properly applied [UFTA] to the facts as found 
below—there is no need to marshal." Ostermiller, 2008 UT App. 249, ^J2, n.L 
The only consideration that constituted "value" received by Mission was the 
$3,629.40 cash reimbursement.13 But the trial court did not determine that the $3,629.40 
cash reimbursement alone was reasonably equivalent to the value of the June Leases. 
(See FR 88 (R. 8109)). Reott has no obligation to marshal the evidence in support of a 
finding that the trial court did not make.14 
The trial court found that Wasatch's offer of $5.00 per net acre for a cash-only 
exchange "constituted reasonably equivalent value" for the June Leases. (See FR 80-81 
(R. 8108)). Wasatch and Mission ultimately agreed to $3,629.40 cash and other non-cash 
consideration as set forth in the June Letter Agreement. (See FR 82 (R. 8108)). Reott 
accepts these factual findings. But because the non-cash consideration cannot be 
considered "Value" under UFTA, the only 'Value" Mission ultimately received was 
$3,629.40 cash, a mere fifty-two cents ($0.52) per net acre for the June Leases. In light 
of the trial court's determination that reasonably equivalent value for a cash-only 
13
 In spite of UFTA5 s clear focus on the "value" received by the debtor, see U.C.A. § 
25-6-6(1 )(a), Wasatch still argues that the trial court's factual findings fully support its 
"conclusion that Wasatch gave reasonably equivalent value for the ten leases interests 
pursuant to the Letter Agreement." (See Appellees Br., at 26 (emphasis added).) 
4
 To the extent Reott is obligated to marshal, where "there simply is no supportive 
evidence, . . . counsel is not expected to marshal the nonexistent." Kimball, 2009 UT 
App. 233, f 20. Under the trial court's findings, evidence that the $3,629.40 cash alone 
was reasonably equivalent to the value of the June Leases is "nonexistent." 
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exchange was $5.00 per net acre, fifty-two cents ($0.52) per net acre does not, as a matter 
of law, constitute reasonably equivalent value. 
Wasatch presents an irrelevant summary of "'all surrounding circumstances' affecting 
the value of the transaction documented in the June 2000 Letter Agreement," (see 
Appellees Br., at 25), which Reott does not and need not challenge. The fact remains that 
when all of the UFTA qualifying consideration is considered, Mission only received 11% 
of what the trial court determined to be the reasonably equivalent value of the June 
Leases. In sum, Reott established Mission's insolvency and failure to receive reasonably 
equivalent value for the June Leases. The trial court therefore erred in concluding that 
Mission did not fraudulently transfer the June Leases under section 25-6-6. 
VTL The Trial Court Applied The Wrong Measure Of Damages. ..$ 
The trial court applied the wrong measure of damages for Wasatch's and BBC's 
breach of their common carrier obligations to Reott. "Whether the district court applied 
the correct rule for measuring damages is a question of law" reviewed for correctness. 
See Mahana v. Onyx, 2004 UT 59, % 25, 96 P.3d 893 (citing Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 
58, <|flf 16, 23, 7 P.3d 786). Wasatch incorrectly attempts to circumvent Reott's challenge 
of the measure of damages by recharacterizing the challenge as going to the adequacy of 
evidence. (See Appellees Br., at 46.) In Traco Steel Erectors, Inc., v. Comtrol, Inc., 
2009 UT 81, 222 P.3d 1164, the Utah Supreme Court explained that the measure of 
damages is at issue when there are "two or more alternative formulae advanced as 
candidates to properly calculate damages." Id. \ 20. In contrast, the adequacy of 
evidence is at issue when one formula applies and a party "challenges the types of 
20 
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evidence the court considered in using the formula to calculate damages." Id % 21. 
In Mahana, the defendant's challenge was to the measure of damages where the 
damages could be measured by either the market value of the property at the time of 
conversion, or the value of the plaintiffs lost use of the converted property. 2004 UT 59, 
fK 25-29. In Lysenko, the issue was whether damages for the lessor's conversion of a 
tenant's property was the market value of the converted property if left in-place ("in-
place" value), or the market value of the converted property if removed ("salvage 
value"). 2000 UT 58, f 16. With two competing measures of market value, the supreme 
court held that "the trial court's determination of the appropriate measure of damages in 
this case involved a legal determination, not a factual determination^]" Id. % 23. 
As in Mahana and Lysenko, the present case involves a determination of the correct 
measure of damages between two competing formulae. First, the trial court adopted 
BBC's theory of damages, concluding that the measure of damages for Wasatch's and 
BBC's breach of their common carrier obligations was the difference between Reott's 
profits that would have been generated during the lost-production period (April 2002 to 
July 2005) and Reott's profits generated during the subsequent in-production period (i.e. 
after July 2005). (FD 63-67 (R. 8210-8211); CD 1-2, 4 (R. 8211-8212).) Or, the trial 
court measured damages based on the difference in the market value of the Lavinia Well 
in 2002 (which, due to the market value of gas, the trial court found to be "effectively 
zero") and the market value of the Lavinia Well in 2008 (which the trial court found to be 
$99,000). (See FD 65-66 (R. 8210-8211)). On the other hand, Reott has explained that 
the appropriate measure of damages for the three years of lost production is determined 
21 
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solely by the profits that would have been generated during the lost-production period, 
without considering the market value of gas or profits generated during the subsequent 
in-production period. Which of these two measures of damages is appropriate for 
Wasatch's and BBC's breach of their common carrier obligations is a purely legal 
question for which Reott has no duty to marshal. See, e.g., Mahana, 2004 UT 59, % 25. 
While both measures of damages involve to some extent a calculation of profits, they 
are fundamentally different formulae.15 See, e.g., Lysenko, 2000 UT 58, f 10 (comparing 
two different methods for measuring the fair market value of converted property and 
concluding that the issue was a question of law). BBC's measure adopts the market-
based approach of American Jurisprudence 2d, which compares the market value of 
goods when sold after a short production delay with the market value of goods when they 
would have been sold but for the delay. {See Appellees Br., at 46-47.) Reott's measure, 
however, adopts the lost-profits/lost-production approach of Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 
692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984) and United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 22 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. 111. 
1938), which does not consider the market value of goods after the production delay. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in not adopting Reott's lost profits measure of 
damages. The lost profits approach advocated by Reott is the more accurate measure of 
damages due to the severe disruption and length of delay in production caused by 
Wasatch and BBC. While the trial court's market based approach "usually" works for 
15
 The trial court acknowledged that it was selecting between two different measures of 
damages: "[B]ecause the Court has adopted [BBC's] theory relative to damages, it would 
not matter if the Court had heard testimony from Dr. Stinson for the [remainder of the 
lost-production period]." (FD 67 (R. 8212)). 
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short delays, such as when "items that were not produced and sold the day of disruption 
could have been produced and sold the next day" (see Appellees Br., at 47 (quoting Am. 
Jur. 2d, Damages § 458) (emphasis added)), it does not work when the disruption 
continues unabated for over three years, as in this case. In situations such as Reott's 
involving unnecessarily prolonged disruption, the risk and injury to the disrupted party is 
more than merely delayed revenue from selling goods one day later. Rather, the injury to 
the business is its inability to operate and survive as a viable, going concern without a 
source of revenue to meet obligations, pay creditors, and take advantage of business 
opportunities. Delayed profits cannot compensate for those injuries. 
Even more, the trial court erred in adopting BBC's market theory as the measure of 
damages because the trial court could not base its compensatory award on the facts it 
found. To compare the profits generated during the in-production period (after July 
2005) with profits that would have been generated during the lost-production period, the 
trial court looked at the price of gas for only three months (January-March 2002) of the 
three-year lost-production period. (FD 63 (R. 8210)). The trial court entered no factual 
findings for the price of gas from April 2002 through July 2005, the remainder of the 
lost-production period. Even more, the trial court only had one year of gas price data for 
April 2005 through April 2006 (id.), but did not enter any factual findings regarding the 
market price of gas after April 2006 even though Reott continued to produce after April 
2006. Accordingly, the trial court erred in adopting a measure of damages for which no 
evidence was presented. See Mahana, 2004 UT 59, % 29 (holding that "the district court 
correctly concluded that" the appropriate measure of damages was "the value of 
23 
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Mahana's lost use of the truck" given that "[t]he district court could not base its 
compensatory award on the market value of the truck at the time of conversion because 
the parties presented no evidence as to that value"). 
VIIL The Trial Court Had No Reasonable Basis To Reopen Causation And Vacate 
Summary Judgment Granted On Reott's Trespass To Chattels Claim. 
The trial court abused its discretion when on the first day of trial it vacated, sua 
sponte and without prior notice, its prior ruling on summary judgment that BBC damaged 
the Lavinia Well and pipeline and caused the oil spill. (R. 5386.) "Under this [abuse of 
discretion] standard, the trial court's ruling may be overturned only 'if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision.'" See Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, 
163 P.3d 615. The trial court did not articulate any reasonable basis to reopen the issue 
of causation, let alone on the first day of trial without prior warning. 
Wasatch argues that, under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the trial court had 
discretion to reconsider its non-final decision because "evidence brought to light at trial 
showed the earlier ruling to be in error." (See Appellees Br., at 45.) Wasatch places the 
cart before the horse. The trial court's vacation of its ruling on causation occurred before 
it heard any evidence at trial. The trial court had no reasonable basis to reverse its prior 
ruling on causation and require Reott, without any opportunity to prepare, to "prove that 
the actions of BBC's crew caused the oil spill." (CD 7 (R. 8212)). 
Incredulously, Wasatch argues that Reott was not prejudiced by the trial court 
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reopening the issue of causation on the first day of trial. Reott was highly prejudiced by 
not knowing well in advance of trial that he must prove causation and that his counsel 
would need to prepare and present witnesses and other evidence showing BBC damaged 
his well. The fact that Reott did scramble under impossible circumstances to present 
some evidence and testimony with regard to causation does not concede a lack of 
prejudice, but rather merely reflects Reott's forced, last-minute attempt to adapt to the 
surprise ruling. The abuse of discretion under these facts is self evident. 
CONCLUSION 
Wasatch has failed to establish that it was a successor in interest to Mission and 
entitled to redeem the Section 32 Leases. Wasatch did not have legal or equitable title in 
the Section 32 Leases because Mission did not orally authorize or ratify Sutton's 
unauthorized execution of the June Letter Agreement or Mineral Lease Assignments. 
Furthermore, Mission's fraudulent transfer under section 25-6-6 defeats Wasatch's legal 
and equitable title to the Section 32 Leases. Reott therefore requests that this Court quiet 
title to the Section 32 Leases in Reott, set aside the June 2000 transfer as fraudulent and 
void, and remand to the trial court for a proper determination of Reott's damages. 
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 Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, Ltd v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 48 P.3d 968, cited by Wasatch as 
support for the trial court's vacatur, are distinguishable from the present case because the 
motions for reconsideration in those cases were not brought on the eve of or during trial. 
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